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Abstract
Hydropower damsare back in the spotlight owing toa shiftingpreference for low
carbon energy generation and their possible contribution to mitigating climate
change. At the forefront of the renaissance of large hydropower dams are
Chinese companies, as the builders of the world’s largest dams at home and
abroad, opening up opportunities for low- and middle-income countries.
However, large hydropower dams, despite their possible developmental and car-
bonreductioncontributions, areaccompaniedbyhugeeconomiccosts, profound
negative environmental changes and social impacts. Using fieldwork data from
four hydropower projects in Ghana, Nigeria, Cambodia and Malaysia, this
paper evaluates the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders engaged in large hydro-
power projects in Asia and Africa. We do this by first exploring the interests of
the different Chinese stakeholders and then by investigating the wider implica-
tions of these Chinese dams on the local, national and international contexts.
The paper concludes that hydropower dams will continue to play a prominent
role in future efforts to increase energy security and reduce energypovertyworld-
wide, therefore the planning, building andmitigation strategies need to be imple-
mented in a more sustainable way that takes into account national development
priorities, the needs of local people and the impacts on natural habitats.
Keywords: China; Africa; Asia; hydropower; development; socio-
environment
The recently concluded COP21 climate change conference in Paris saw the adop-
tion by 195 countries of the Paris Agreement, which acknowledged the “need to
promote universal access to sustainable energy in developing countries.”1
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Supported by international organizations such as the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA), hydropower has been promoted as a clean and
green source of energy at COP21, and several countries, France among them,
announced that they would spend €2 billion in Africa on renewable energy gen-
eration including hydropower projects.2
In the face of an increasing world population and the accompanying rising
demand for energy, building large hydropower dams has become an attractive
policy solution to fuel development. According to an official at the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris, hydropower is viewed positively
as one of the mitigation strategies for climate change at a global level.3 Other
benefits include flood control, technological progress and job creation.4
However, large hydropower dams, despite their possible developmental and car-
bon reduction contribution, are accompanied by huge economic cost,5 profound
negative environmental changes,6 and social issues.7
As the builders of the world’s largest dams, Chinese companies and financiers
are at the forefront of the renaissance of large hydropower dams.8 China houses
half of the world’s 80,000 dams,9 and Chinese firms have the mature technology
and expertise in the field of dam construction that allow them to build dams at
lower cost than their Western competitors.10 However, these hydropower dam
builders are having to look overseas for new projects because of such reasons
as the Chinese government’s “going out” strategy, increasing domestic competi-
tion, and the declining number of suitable sites for new dams within Chinese bor-
ders, to name but a few. These overseas hydropower projects can be tied in with
Chinese government aid, preferential loans and resources repayment, and almost
always correlate with increasing trade and investment levels in the receiving coun-
tries. The majority of new dam projects have been proposed in South-East Asia
(141) and Africa (94), and more recently in Latin America (23).11 Sinohydro, also
known as PowerChina, a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), is the leading
global hydropower firm in terms of the number and size of dams built, invest-
ment sums and global coverage.12 It completed its first large hydropower project
in 2003 and is now associated with over 122 international projects.13
2 “COP21: France to spend billions on African renewable energy projects,” The Guardian, 1 December
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/01/cop21-france-to-spend-billions-on-african-
renewable-energy-projects. Accessed 1 March 2016.
3 Interviews with IEA representative, Paris, 23 June 2015.
4 Billington and Jackson 2006.
5 World Commission on Dams 2000; Ansar et al. 2014; Sovacool, Nugent and Gilbert 2014.
6 Brown et al. 2009
7 Sovacool and Bulan 2011; McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber 2010.
8 Urban et al. 2015b.
9 Walker and Qin 2015.
10 Interview with Sinohydro representative, Beijing, May 2015.
11 International Rivers 2012.
12 Urban et al. 2015b.
13 Bosshard 2014.
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Many factors contribute to the “successful” building and long-term manage-
ment of a mega hydropower project, ranging from rigorous environmental
impact assessments (EIA), best-practice engineering, fair resettlement procedures
and just compensation, to thorough environmental mitigation strategies such as
grievance and complaints mechanisms, corporate social responsibilities (CSR)
and attention to social and local cultural practices. In addition, the host country’s
agencies and regulatory framework also play a vital role in determining the
immediate outcomes and long-term implications of these Chinese hydropower
projects. However, this paper moves away from host country regulatory frame-
works and instead aims to address the role of Chinese actors in the global hydro-
power industry. This is because there is a greater need to deconstruct the Chinese
hydropower sector, in terms of the motives of different actors, the types of con-
tracts agreed and how they are negotiated, and how the impacts are managed and
mitigated by Chinese companies. It is only through understanding what drives
the Chinese actors and how these processes work that we will be able to engage
these Chinese stakeholders to better manage and mitigate the impacts of mega
development projects.
This paper aims to investigate what shapes the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders
engaged in large hydropower projects in Asia and Africa. In addition to stakeholder
mapping and Nvivo data analysis, we use empirical data from four case studies in
Asia (the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia and the Bakun Dam in Malaysia) and
Africa (the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Zamfara Dam in Nigeria), and interviews
conducted in China, to triangulate information on the Chinese hydropower indus-
try. We aim to gain a better understanding of the motives of these actors, the
decision-making processes in the implementation and mitigation phases, and their
power relations in conjunction with each other. The analysis of the data is largely
guided by a political ecology conceptual framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the conceptual framework and methodology. This is followed by an examination
of the motives of various actors. The paper continues with an assessment of the
different modalities and the negotiation process for these projects, and then inves-
tigates the ways in which Chinese stakeholders mitigate the impacts of these over-
seas hydropower dams. It concludes with an assessment of the sustainability of
these mega projects, contributions to the theoretical framework and policy impli-
cations of these findings.
Conceptual Framework and Methodology: Political Ecology of Chinese
Hydropower Dams
The political ecology framework14 is used as a basis for analysing the implica-
tions caused by the varied forms of control over the access to natural resources
such as water, fisheries and energy to highlight governance issues and the unequal
14 Wolf 1972.
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distribution of costs and benefits associated with environmental change brought
by human intervention.15 “It is an integrated understanding of how environmen-
tal and political forces interact to mediate social and environmental change.”16
The power relations between different actors are at the heart of the political ecol-
ogy framework, and power is conceptualized by the ability to control access to
valued environmental resources, the main objective of which is control and/or
access to the economic benefits ensuing from resource exploitation.17 Different
resources such as knowledge and technology as well as access to information
empower different actors to varying degrees to effect change on the environment.
Large-scale dam development provokes strong emotions because of the uneven
distribution of costs and benefits, which in turn focuses attention on the political
environment and the actors involved. It is therefore vital to investigate actors’
interests and how these interests determine the behaviour of actors operating at
the national and international level, and how they might influence the locals’
interaction with the resources. A key advantage of this approach is that it allows
for a more complex understanding of the interactions between these actors.18
However, this approach tends to treat the actors (such as businesses) as mono-
lithic entities.19 This becomes problematic when assessing the power relations
between stakeholders in an industry, the host-state agencies vis-à-vis trans-
national businesses, as the footlessness of these latter actors enables them to be
less constrained by the regulatory power held by host governments. This paper
fills this gap by deconstructing the Chinese hydropower sector by examining
where the actual power lies among the various actors involved, and what empow-
ers these actors.
When we refer to sustainability in relation to hydropower developments, we
refer to the environmental, social and economic dimensions of sustainable devel-
opment. We use the Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development,
which is “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”20 However, the con-
cept of sustainable development is always problematic as the economic dimen-
sions often tend to prevail in concerns about sustainability. In this paper, we
attempt to address particularly the social and environmental sustainability
aspects of building dams. As dams often produce large-scale adverse effects, it
is vital to have mitigation strategies that can alleviate the worst impacts on
local people, their livelihoods and the environment.
In this analysis, the Bui Dam in Ghana and the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia
form the main basis of our discussion, with supplementary information from
the Bakun Dam in Malaysia and the Zamfara Dam in Nigeria. The three dams
15 Bryant and Bailey 1997; Blaikie 1985; Tan-Mullins 2007.
16 Bryant 1992, 12.
17 Bryant 1997, 11; see also Peluso 1992; Bryant 1996.
18 Bryant and Bailey 1997.
19 Bury 2008.
20 UN and WCED 1987.
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in Cambodia, Malaysia and Ghana were completed and operationalized, whereas
the dam in Nigeria was never constructed following reconnaissance surveys and
feasibility studies. We conducted 68 interviews with members of the affected com-
munities, and 82 interviews with policymakers, dam building companies, dam
financiers, experts, non-governmental agencies and international agencies, in add-
ition to examining the data from 40 focus groups and 149 household surveys in
these four countries and China. We also undertook multi-level stakeholder map-
ping in order to identify the key stakeholders engaged in Chinese overseas hydro-
power projects in Cambodia, Ghana, Malaysia and Nigeria, as well as to gain a
better understanding of the Chinese stakeholder landscape. We used the
Net-Mapping Approach for the stakeholder analysis in order to determine key sta-
keholders, direct and indirect links to other stakeholders, and power relations.21
In addition to this qualitative primary information, we used quantitative sec-
ondary data from International Rivers’ extensive database, which includes com-
prehensive up-to-date data about each of China’s hydropower projects worldwide
(for example, contractor, developer, financier, costs, size, location, environmental
and social implications). We compiled secondary data to assess the environmen-
tal impacts of dams and their governance implications by examining the EIA
reports of the dams. We also analysed dam project documentation and firms’
strategies, such as Sinohydro’s environmental and social strategies. We analysed
the qualitative data by categorizing and coding the sources as a means of com-
paring and contrasting interpretations of events.22 We used the Nvivo 10 software
to analyse the interview and focus group consultation data. These were analysed
using narrative analysis rather than conventional “code and retrieve” methods
since the former allows for more layers of embodied meaning to be revealed by
including narrative style.23 This approach allowed us to compare several cases
and draw parallels from similar findings and flag up any differences.24 The
next sections will present the results and analysis.
The Motives of Various Actors
There are many actors involved in a Chinese overseas hydropower project cycle,
and they have varying amounts of power vis-à-vis other actors within this indus-
try and beyond, as illustrated in Figure 1. The lines in the figure represent the dif-
ferent flows of resources while the size of the symbols illustrates the power of the
stakeholder. Among the ministries, the State Council and Political Bureau are
perceived to be the most powerful actors, while the Export–Import Bank of
China (ExIm Bank) is the most dominant actor in terms of financial flow. The
stakeholder mapping of Chinese hydropower shows ten stakeholder groups and
21 Schiffer 2007.
22 Wolcott 1990.
23 Wiles, Rosenberg and Kearns 2005.
24 Yin 2009.
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28 actors, which include financiers, contractors, operators, government agencies
and local NGOs. Dam builders are excluded for reasons elaborated on in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
There are numerous Chinese dam builders, and the companies registered and
operating in China can vary from those subsidiaries specifically set up for over-
seas operation. These actors are usually the ones with the most power to effect
physical changes on the environment,25 and subsequently on the livelihood
options and power relations of the stakeholders at the local level. There are
approximately 12 main builders, the biggest of which are Sinohydro,
PowerChina Resources Limited (which is an international subsidiary of
Sinohydro), China Huaneng Group, China Huadian Corporation, and the
China Three Gorges Corporation. There are also many small players in the
industry, such as suppliers and grid operators like Dongfang and China State
Grid. Chinese dam financiers include firms such as ExIm Bank, Chinese
Development Bank (CDB), Sinosure, and to a lesser extent, commercial/or non-
policy banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Bank of
China (BoC).26
In interviews, many of the companies indicated that besides profits, the factors
driving them to invest overseas included the “going out” policy, stiff competition
within China, sector reforms, the declining number of suitable sites for new dams
in China, and the lack of international competitors. Low costs, access to large
Figure 1: Stakeholder Mapping of Chinese Hydropower Sector
25 Bryant 1997.
26 Mertha 2008.
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finance and at times cheap loans (necessary for large infrastructural projects), and
a big portfolio of domestic projects also make them attractive partners for clients
around the world.27 According to one interviewee: “Big dam building is an
important part of the ‘going out’ strategy, but I think it is just business; it has
no strong relationship with political issues. On the one hand, there is market
demand; on the other hand, China has rich experience of building dams. The
domestic capacity in China is over supplied, so Chinese dam firms need to go glo-
bal.”28 The “going out” policy was officially introduced in 2001 in China’s Tenth
Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), and was aimed at raising the rate of outflow foreign
direct investment (FDI). It was comprehensively implemented in the 11th
Five-Year Plan, which was drafted in 2006.29 A key aspect of this strategy is
the undertaking of overseas contracts, especially infrastructure projects like
roads, dams and telecommunications, all of which benefit the hydropower sector
greatly.
There is intense competition among Chinese dam builders.30 First, as indicated
above, there are over 12 major companies in a highly skilled and capital-intensive
sector, many of which are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the past, it was pos-
sible to undertake projects that provided minimal profits, as national policy
guidelines overrode profit concerns. In recent years, however, the number of over-
seas projects has become one of the key assessment criteria for leadership per-
formance evaluations, and consequently such projects have been driven by
senior executives seeking to maintain their status amid government SOE restruc-
turing initiatives.31 Companies have also begun to look for ways to improve their
profit margins and increase revenues by investing in the global market and cut-
ting costs. Sector reforms in 2003, which involved privatizing five of China’s lar-
gest power companies, placed companies in a better position to capitalize on their
competitive advantages, function independently from central government direc-
tives and focus on profit-making.32 With fewer suitable sites for new mega
dams in China, these companies recognize the need to explore external markets.
As such, many firms, with little or no international market experience, have been
compelled to explore new regions in the global hydropower industry such as
Africa and Latin America. This has also meant that they are “confronted with
challenges and responsibilities unfamiliar to them in China.”33
The lack of competition in the international market in both the construction and
financing sectors is another pull factor for Chinese companies. Chinese construc-
tion firms have interests in as many as 350 dams in 74 countries, and Sinohydro,
27 Bosshard 2010.
28 Interview with ExIm Bank, Beijing, August 2013.
29 CCPIT (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade). 2010. www.ccpit.org. Accessed 2
March 2016.
30 Interview with representative from Three Gorges Dam, Malaysia, July 2014.
31 Interview with representative from Sinohydro, Malaysia, July 2014.
32 McDonald, Bosshard and Brewer 2009.
33 International Rivers 2012, 6.
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an SOE engineering and construction company with a registered capital of 4 billion
yuan, is a huge player in the hydropower industry. The reasons that there are so few
global dam builders include the huge investment costs required to get projects to
the construction stage, the negative opinions surrounding mega dam projects in
terms of social and environmental impacts, and the high cost of compliance with
social and environmental mitigation strategies required for such projects.34 As
such, there is a huge gap in the market for the Chinese dam builders to fill.
Furthermore, Chinese government funding for many of these projects comes
with the conditionality that Chinese firms are contracted to build them.
Many Chinese hydropower companies are SOEs, and as mentioned above,
although profit margin is one the main concerns for transnational companies,
business decisions are sometimes made regardless of whether there will be
positive returns. Likewise, some profitable dam proposals are halted owing to
political reasons. This is because some of the projects are politically influenced,
initiated and guaranteed by the Chinese government and, at times, aided by pref-
erential loans. According to a Forbes report in 2015, 65 per cent of Chinese for-
eign direct investments make a loss, which is 15 per cent more than the 50 per
cent global norm.35 An informant from a hydropower company also confirmed
that “there are some obvious risks associated with some projects, but our business
decisions are at times influenced by the government directives and the go-ahead is
announced despite reservations from our company’s senior management.”36
Several Chinese ministries are involved to various extents in the project cycle of
an overseas Chinese dam venture. They include the State Council, the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP), and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC).37 Although there are some provincial and municipal
agencies involved in overseas dam building, they are not covered in this paper,
as the overseas dam projects discussed here are of a size and scope that they
require the approval of Chinese government agencies at the national level.
Every project that is greater than US$2 billion requires approval from the
State Council, endorsement by the NDRC and MOFCOM approval as part of
the 12th Five-Year Plan reforms.38 Furthermore, the State Council is the most
powerful actor in the Chinese government and the overarching agency that over-
sees MOFCOM and the NDRC, the two most important stakeholders in the
approval and supervision of overseas dam projects. MOFCOM is the main insti-
tute that approves and manages the overseas investments by SOEs, which
includes hydropower dams. The NDRC approves smaller projects (less than
US$2 billion) and regulates overseas investments. The MOFA then provides
34 Interview with representative from an embassy, Ghana, September 2013.
35 Sautman and Yan 2015.
36 Interview with representative from a Chinese hydropower company, Cambodia, October 2013.
37 Urban et al. 2013.
38 Ibid.
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advice on Chinese foreign policy, such as aid matters, while the MEP advises on
environmental protection issues such as the EIA. Finally, SASAC assesses the
performance of the SOEs.39 As indicated above, although some of the decisions
are driven more by policies than revenue, we should not overestimate the power
of these ministries over the companies. The Chinese government could and does
influence these companies if there is a strategic case for doing so. Otherwise, these
companies are generally not under the control of the national government and, in
terms of decision making, are governed by boards and private investors.
One interesting aspect of the Chinese hydropower industry is that the financiers
of these overseas projects tend to be Chinese state-owned banks such as the ExIm
Bank and the CDB. In the past, concessional loans formed the majority of
Chinese government aid to foreign countries. Today, most of the loans are at
commercial rates. One major financial factor is China’s willingness to lend to
large, sometimes controversial, infrastructure projects when no one else
will. The ExIm Bank, an export credit agency, is the most powerful creditor
among the Chinese banks and funds the majority of China’s overseas dams,
including the Merowe Dam in Sudan, the Bui Dam, and the Kamchay Dam.
Similar to the dam construction companies, most of these banks are SOEs and
some of their decision making is influenced by Chinese government directives.
However, the main criterion of making a profit still dominates when it comes
to disbursing the loan. These Chinese banks usually conduct a risk assessment
to address bad loan concerns. Many of these banks see political instability or
leadership change as the biggest risk. For example, a representative from the
ExIm Bank indicated that “political stability is at the top of the risk assessment
followed by environmental and legal risk.”40 In addition, they also prefer to
finance Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) projects rather than
Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) and Private–Public Partnership (PPP) pro-
jects, as the latter two are considered too risky, as we discuss next.
Different Modalities and Processes
The fluid power relations between different actors involved in the Chinese hydro-
power sector are best understood through an examination of the procedures
involved in a mega dam project, from the opening negotiations to completion.
Large scale infrastructure projects are usually initiated by the government of
the host country and can be negotiated directly with a builder, or else they can
be negotiated between the Chinese and host governments and then later opened
up for bids.41 For example, Sinohydro negotiated the Bui Dam in Ghana right
from the beginning, but only became the developer for the Kamchay Dam
after the deal was agreed between the two governments. If a project requires
39 International Rivers 2012.
40 Interview with China ExIm Bank, Beijing, August 2013.
41 Interview with representative from a Chinese hydropower company, Malaysia, July 2013.
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funding from Chinese financiers, the economic counsellor office of the host coun-
try’s embassy in China and the domestic industry association then jointly provide
a letter of support. With this backing, the Chinese builder (if already in the pro-
cess) then negotiates with bank and credit insurance companies for loans. The
bank then submits the financing schedule first to the Chinese MOFCOM and
then to the insurance companies for approval. The loan amount will only be fina-
lized after the on-site assessment reports are evaluated and the approval proce-
dures of the host country completed, which varies from country to country.42
This means the power largely lies in the hands of the builders and the host gov-
ernments, as the Chinese government and financiers have very little say in the
terms and conditions of the contracts and are only involved after the developer
has been decided.
There are several contract types, for example BOT, EPC and PPP as well as
other smaller types of contracts such as contracting and project management.
The first three types have both advantages and disadvantages. At times, the
power relations between the Chinese actors within the dam industry and the
local/host partners and stakeholders are determined by the project type. EPC pro-
jects, also known as turnkey contracts, mean that the builder is contracted by a
national developer and has complete responsibility for constructing the project in
its entirety, from beginning to completion. EPC contracts have a lower financial
risk (as they are with a contractor and not an investor) but carry a higher cancel-
lation risk, as local partners could pull out if there are any issues. Sinohydro
prefers EPC contracts as they reduce its risks by lowering its financial investment
in the projects. For example, the Bui Dam is an EPC project funded by ExIm
Bank. After the dam was constructed, it was handed over to the host government,
which set up the Bui Power Authority to operate and manage the dam and its
impacts, including the resettlement of local people and compensation. This pro-
ject type also means the Chinese contractors tend to have very little engagement
with local stakeholders or communities, as risks such as local opposition are usu-
ally left to the national developer or government agencies and not dealt with by
the contractor.43 However, this does not mean that the contractor has no power
over these communities; the construction of large dams alters the environment
drastically in terms of water provision and livelihood options. This affects the
communities’ abilities to make decisions about their lives and livelihoods and
their power vis-à-vis these development actors to varying degrees. This is different
for many non-Chinese contractors, who consider issues such as involuntary
resettlement, compensation and the environmental impacts of the dam as a result
of their work, and may therefore be more proactive about such matters.
A BOT contract means the dam-building company will build and have owner-
ship of the dam for a certain period of time, after which the dam will be handed
over to the local government. Many banks and builders prefer this type of
42 Interview with Sinohydro, Beijing, September 2013.
43 Interview with bank official, Beijing, September 2013.
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contract as there is less risk in terms of repayment; the builders will be able to
recuperate the cost in years to come and it is more profitable in the long run.
The Kamchay Dam, built by Sinohydro, is an example of a BOT contract.
According to Sinohydro, Cambodia presents higher risks in terms of both polit-
ical and operational issues.44 The latter is owing to the low quantity of water
resources that can be used for power generation as there is an extended dry season
in the country. This means the dam can only effectively run for six to seven
months per year. To mitigate the risk of non-repayment, a law was passed by
the Cambodian government that promises to bail out the company if such cir-
cumstances arise. In addition, the period of BOT ownership, usually 25–30
years, was extended to 44 years to make the investment more worthwhile, and
so the project went ahead.
The BOT model gives the builders a lot more power in terms of ensuring (or
reducing) the sustainability of these mega projects, as they are in full control
(or denial) of the mitigation strategies and other sustainability issues of the
dam in the long term. Despite this, the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh pointed
out that “BOT means an investment, it is purely economic and profit-driven
based. It is not an aid project … It is difficult for the embassy or ExIm Bank
or others to interfere as this is purely an economic investment.”45 Yet, there
may be the motivation and a responsibility (often legal) for the company to do
more in terms of environmental protection and community development as
they are present for a longer period.46 What is important with this model is
that it may provide a negotiation space between the Chinese builders and the
local communities. In theory, this allows a shifting of power between the builders
and the local communities and civil society in terms of mitigation strategies and
resettlement processes, which could have a positive outcome in terms of impact
mitigation and ensuring the sustainability of the project. For example,
Sinohydro claim that at the Kamchay Dam, following negotiations between
the company and the Kamchay governor on behalf of the local community,
the company permitted the local bamboo collectors, who weave the canes into
baskets for a living, to access part of the private land that now belongs to
Sinohydro to harvest bamboo. However, local villagers also have complained
that they are experiencing severe hardship and loss of income owing to the flood-
ing of the old bamboo area for the reservoir. Moreover, Sinohydro frequently
closes the new bamboo area, which is also very far away, for extended periods
of time.47 The local government also complained about contractual issues with
Sinohydro as it is still waiting for payments to be made for environmental miti-
gation such as afforestation.48 BOT contracts can lead to a wider range of
44 Interview with Sinohydro, Cambodia, 18 October 2013.
45 Interview with representative of the PRC embassy, Cambodia, 2013.
46 “Chinese dam builders going overseas,” http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/chinese-dam-
builders. Accessed 29 February 2016
47 Interviews with local community, Cambodia, May 2014.
48 Interviews with government officials, Cambodia, September 2014.
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corporate behaviour, from close cooperation between dam builders and local/
national institutions to address the adverse effects of large dams to dam builders
leaving the management of the dam and its impacts completely to local/national
institutions.
The PPP contract is currently the model preferred by local host and Chinese
governments, as it gives ownership of the project to the builder and the host coun-
try’s partners. It is viewed as the least risky type of contract as it requires com-
mitment from all parties, and is also seen as the most feasible in terms of
mitigating social and environmental implications owing to the long-term owner-
ship and involvement of all relevant parties.49 The Chinese central government
has also recently promoted PPP by awarding domestic PPP projects worth 3–8
million yuan each.50 However, this is the least preferred model for some dam
builders for the very the same reasons; they view long-term commitment as
high risk, especially if the country is not politically stable. With regard to con-
tracting and project management, the Chinese builders are footloose in terms
of their embeddedness in the local context and communities. They have very little
ownership or commitment to the local communities and their roles are very con-
strained because of the short amount of time they spend in the project location.
The Bakun Dam is a good example of a Chinese dam builder, Sinohydro, being a
contractor for a dam construction project. Sinohydro was engaged at a later stage
of the process to build part of the dam. The firm’s job is to construct the relevant
component and leave immediately. Although it has no obligations regarding
social and environmental compliance, it does discuss matters such as construction
compliance and labour issues with the local government agencies. Our interviews
indicate that when Sinohydro is unfamiliar with the local regulatory framework,
it usually engages local employees to overcome any issues.51 However, as its role
is confined to the job specification, it has little or no power over the resettlement
of the affected communities and rehabilitation of the immediate vicinity.
The above discussion demonstrates how power is manifest in different actors
according to their varying abilities to engage with local stakeholders and their dif-
ferent roles and responsibilities in the project which in turn impact the sustain-
ability of these hydropower projects. However, both the degree of
sustainability of a hydropower project and the ability of Chinese transnational
companies (TNCs) to impact on the physical environment through their invest-
ments and to affect communities in sovereign spaces beyond their home country
call for a systematic understanding of how they operate and implement mitiga-
tion strategies such as CSR. May Tan-Mullins and Giles Mohan have also
argued that in order to understand how Chinese companies operate in overseas
49 Interview with dam builder, Beijing, 8 May 2015.
50 “China to replace subsidy with reward to underpin PPP projects,” The China Daily, 17 December 2015,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-12/17/content_22733729.htm. Accessed 2 March 2016.
51 Interview with representative from a Chinese hydropower company, Malaysia, July 2013.
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contexts, we need to look at the home country’s regulatory and impact mitigation
norms, to which we will now turn.52
The Risk Mitigation Process
In China, Chinese companies are legally bound by environmental regulations such
as the project-based EIA mechanism and the national environment monitoring
network along with more than 200 environmental policies, laws and regulations.53
In addition, SASAC has also called for SOEs to not only develop in a people-
centred, “scientific” way and make profits but also to take responsibility for all sta-
keholders and the environment, and ultimately to harmonize the enterprise with
social and environmental development.54 In 2008, the State Council also issued
the Administrative Regulation on Contracting Foreign Projects. This was supple-
mented with guidelines on foreign investment and cooperation including the “Nine
principles of the State Council on encouraging and regulating China’s outbound
investment.” In particular, MOFCOM and the MEP issued “Guidelines on envir-
onmental protection in overseas investment and cooperation” in 2013.55
However, the Chinese government’s push for social and environmental compli-
ance from the TNCs is confined to vague and broad legislative requirements
spread over a cross section of foreign investment laws and optional guidelines
which have no means of enforcement or follow through.56 The situation is further
exacerbated when firms carry out projects overseas as the Chinese government
does not regulate activities beyond its borders: to enforce PRC laws on Chinese
firms acting in another country would be an infringement of the other country’s
national sovereignty. However, the Chinese government has made it clear through
public announcements that Chinese companies must abide by local laws, as it does
not want China’s reputation and soft power tarnished by the unlawful behaviour
of Chinese companies. When Chinese firms carry out projects in Asia and Africa,
they have to abide by the local regulations of the host countries.42 Our fieldwork
indicates that Chinese dam builders usually attempt to adhere to the social and
environmental policies and guidelines of the host country, in so far as they
exist. In the absence of such policies and guidelines, Chinese dam builders will
usually attempt to follow China’s domestic policies and guidelines. The national
host context therefore determines the quality of the impact mitigation of large
dams.57 However, according to our interviewees, many of these guidelines are
not enforced, are very general and need to be more sector specific.58
52 Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013.
53 Fu et al. 2007.
54 SASAC 2008.
55 MOFCOM, SASAC and UNDP 2015.
56 Ni, Sarkis and Zhu 2011.
57 Urban et al. 2015a; 2015b.
58 Interview with an embassy representative in Malaysia, July 2013; interview with a representative from
an embassy in Cambodia, October 2013.
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SOEs such as Sinohydro also have comprehensive CSR programmes published
on their websites. Sinohydro indicates on its website that it is committed to inte-
grating social and environmental aspects in its tender submissions, in addition to
the World Bank’s safeguard policy. The company also published its ethical prin-
ciples and sustainable policy online in 2014.59 Johan Nordensvärd and Frauke
Urban note that these policies were similar to the World Bank standards in
2011, but were then replaced by weaker policies in 2013 and 2014 after
Sinohydro was restructured.60 The restructuring involved splitting up the com-
pany into Sinohydro Resources and Sinohydro International, while
PowerChina was created as a parent company owned by SASAC. In addition,
Sinohydro was proud to obtain the ISO14001, an international standard for
operations and environmental protection issued by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). But, there is little mention of CSR activ-
ities in their overseas operations. Moreover, most of the activities organized in the
names of CSR are philanthropic acts. For example, Sinohydro considered help-
ing the local village schools in Malaysia,61 and donations for disaster relief and
training local people in Cambodia are regarded as CSR initiatives.62 Yet, these
are positive examples of Chinese overseas firms; many Chinese dam builders
have no environmental and social policies in place.
As discussed above, given that much of the financing for SOEs comes from
China’s development banks, it is significant that in 2007 China started requiring
commercial banks to review and weigh each applicant’s environmental history
before approving credit applications.63 Particularly, the MEP, with the China
Banking Regulatory Commission, established a “green credit system,” which
aims to restrict the availability of credit to companies that violate environmental
laws.64 This was endorsed by the China ExIm Bank, which adopted an environ-
mental policy in 2004. More specific guidelines on social and environmental
impact assessment were also added in 2007. The China Banking Regulatory
Commission also launched the Green Credit Policy in 2012. However, the proto-
col requires projects to comply with host country policies – but not international
standards – regarding environmental assessment, resettlement and consultation.65
This has major implications in the African continent as most of the EPC loans
there were disbursed by the China ExIm Bank without serious examination of
the environmental and social implications of these new projects.66
However, this has changed recently. Merowe Dam, according to some Chinese
financiers, is an important turning point in the awareness of the greater
59 Sinohydro. 2014. http://eng.sinohydro.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=9. Accessed
17 March 2016.
60 Nordensvärd and Urban 2015.
61 Interview with Sinohydro, Malaysia, July 2013.
62 Interview with Sinohydro, Cambodia, Oct 2013.
63 Chan-Fishel and Lawson 2007.
64 Bu et al. 2009.
65 Bosshard 2008.
66 Moss and Rose 2006.
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implications of Chinese hydropower dams. According to an informant from the
China ExIm Bank, “we could not close our eyes to the impacts anymore,” and as
a result it has imposed stricter evaluation procedures regarding the social and
environmental impacts of overseas projects.67 This move was also compelled
by stricter environmental laws in China coupled with international pressure at
the local level (in China and host countries) and international civil society and
media.
What is interesting is that even within the same company there are different
standards of compliance owing to the maturities of the company’s subsidiaries
and divisions and their varying degrees of awareness. For example, bureaus 8
and 14 of Sinohydro have better records of compliance because they have had
more international exposure and experience.68 In conjunction to the above, the
type of project (for example, BOT or EPC) has an impact on the compliance
and risk mitigation strategies of these companies. We will now use the next
few paragraphs to compare and contrast Sinohydro’s EPC experience with the
Bui Dam (Bureau 8) in Ghana and its BOT experience with the Kamchay
Dam in Cambodia (managed by PowerChina Resources and Bureau 8) in
order to illustrate the different risk mitigation strategies of the same company.
Built by Sinohydro, the Bui Dam is an EPC contract, the majority of funding
for which came from the ExIm Bank. The dam should bring 400 MW of electri-
city to Ghana’s struggling power grid and allow some electricity exports to West
African neighbours. The local partner in this project is the Bui Power Authority
(BPA), whose role it is to monitor the delivery of the contract and manage
resettlement during construction. Thus, the BPA has its own engineers and agents
to report on quality and progress as well as health, safety and environmental
standards. The BPA is also responsible for the forced resettlement of several
thousand local people and their compensation payments.
One of the most contentious issues surrounding the Bui Dam is its environmen-
tal mitigation strategy. There is a huge gap between the project’s EIA recommenda-
tions and their implementation. The Bui Dam’s EIA had been conducted for a
previous potential investor. Claire Sutcliffe assessed the dam’s compliance with the
EIA recommendations and found that many of the criteria, such as consultation
with the local people, health and livelihood security and adequate compensation,
were blatantly ignored.69 However, as the EIA had been undertaken before the
deal with Sinohydro was fully negotiated, no reference was made to Sinohydro.
This could also be attributed to the fact that Sinohydro was not involved in any of
the planning processes (EIA, resettlement and dam design) prior to the construction
of the project. This is because it is an EPC project and the power tomitigate the risks
and outcomes lay in the hands of the local owners, the BPA. As such, it is difficult
to ensure that those charged with the implementation and construction of such a
67 Interview with Chinese bank representative, Beijing, August 2013.
68 Interview with Sinohydro, Beijing, September 2013.
69 Sutcliffe 2009; Hensengerth 2013; Kirchherr, Disselhoff and Charles 2016.
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project own up to the social and environmental responsibilities that come with it.
Furthermore, the low standing of the Ghanaian regulatory authorities in this sector
makes rigorous environmental supervision difficult and leaves room for speculation
as to how closely Sinohydro is adhering to the environmental conditions.
The Kamchay Dam is Cambodia’s first large hydropower dam, with an
installed capacity of 194 MW. The Kamchay deal was strongly supported and
driven forward by the Cambodian prime minister himself, Hun Sen, to alleviate
energy poverty, increase energy security and power economic growth. The
Kamchay Dam is also the first in a series of dams to be financed and built by
Chinese dam builders in Cambodia, and was financed by the China ExIm
Bank and built by Sinohydro.
The Kamchay Dam has had a severe impact on the local population. Although
there are no resettled communities from the area as the dam is located in Bokor
National Park, there are approximately 22,000 people living in the rural area who
have been affected by the dam.70 Four groups of people in particular have borne
the brunt of the changes: the bamboo collectors, firewood collectors, fruit sellers
and durian farmers. Environmental impacts were particularly apparent during
the dam’s construction, the most obvious being the flooding of 2,291 hectares
of forest in the national park71 which was previously used by the local commu-
nities for the collection of non-timber forest products such as bamboo.72 The
dam has also hurt fish stocks and it is estimated that the migration patterns of
at least 15 fish species, including threatened species, have been severely disturbed.
There have been serious shortcomings with regards to the Environmental and
Social Impacts Assessment (ESIA). Under Cambodian law, development projects
such as dams are required to have an EIA in place and approved before the con-
struction process begins. Cambodian law also prescribes that the EIA process
should be transparent, all decision making should be accountable, and a wide
consultation process should involve affected local communities and civil society
organizations.73 However, the Kamchay Dam’s EIA process was flawed. It
started late and the final EIA approval was in fact granted seven months after
the inauguration of the dam.74 An NGO representative reported that “The
main concern was that the Kamchay Dam was constructed before the approval
of the EIA report. Therefore, the dam was constructed without having cleared
EIA and [with] no Environmental Management Plan.”75
Although there was a consultation process, according to one source, the “EIA
consultation process was very rushed. The document was given to the consulted
agencies on the Friday afternoon for a meeting on Monday morning. It is
extremely difficult to read and assess the document as it is usually a couple of
70 NGO Forum Cambodia 2013.
71 SAWAC. 2011. http://www.sawac.co.za/articles.htm. Accessed 18 March 2016.
72 Urban et al. 2015a; 2015b.
73 Urban et al. 2015b; Middleton 2008; NGO Forum 2013.
74 Urban et al. 2015b; NGO Forum 2013.
75 Interview with an NGO representative, Cambodia, May 2014.
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hundred pages long.”76 The consultation process prior to the dam’s construction
was patchy and ad hoc with little local participation, as our fieldwork and other
reports confirm.77 Even today, several years into the operation of the dam, no
English version of the ESIA report is available and the Cambodian version is
only available to certain parties upon formal request to the Ministry of the
Environment. It has been reported by several experts that the content of the
ESIA is of poor quality. For example, the ESIA does not assess the impact of
the dam on species and habitats and merely lists which species live in the national
park.78 Overall, the implementation of environmental and social safeguards was
minimal and not in line with Cambodian legislation. In addition, the
Environmental Management Plan, which aims to implement mitigation measures
to reduce the negative effects of the dam, was not put in place until the final
stages of the dam’s construction.
Theoretically, as the Kamchay Dam is a BOT project, the builder (Sinohydro)
should be more engaged with the local stakeholders in terms of consultation and
mitigation strategies as there is a greater need to ensure the sustainability of this
project in order to recoup the investment. And, indeed, there was consultation
with local stakeholders with regards to the EIA reports, as demonstrated earlier.
However, our fieldwork has found that the EIA is often just a rubber-stamping
exercise; it can be conducted in a very rushed manner, sometimes using generic
texts, and often lacks any proper meaningful consultation with the other stake-
holders such as the local community and civil society. Indeed, the usual com-
plaints of non-compliance, as illustrated above, usually centre upon matters
such as the lack of transparency, the poor dissemination of information to the
public and the inadequate implementation of the EIA.79 If there is any consult-
ation process at all, it usually involves low-ranking officials with no real power to
make or implement any changes. In addition, many locals are not consulted and
public participation therefore exists only on paper rather than in practice.
From our case studies, we found that major BOT companies are committed to
following international standards but seldom implement them. This may be
owing to the lack of manpower, willing or skillsets of the local project managers
at the site, which may be at odds with the ambitions of the company heads.
PowerChina Resources and Datang have both committed to World Bank safe-
guarding policies, and Datang, Huadian and Huaneng have signed up to the
United Nations Global Compact, although performance in the field remains pat-
chy.80 Chinese companies have strong commitments to EMP and EIA but have
big policy gaps in downstream flow, transboundary impacts, community rela-
tions and labour management, as our case studies show. Weak performance on
the ground could be owing to many factors such as poor training, unfamiliarity
76 Ibid.
77 International Rivers 2012.
78 Hensengerth 2015
79 Interview with an ambassador and NGO representative, Cambodia, May 2013.
80 See https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ for information on the UN Global Compact.
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with the local context, language barriers, a lack of contacts, different modalities
determining the interaction with local communities, and an incomplete under-
standing of the challenges local communities face because of the dam’s construc-
tion. For example, Sinohydro is said to have set aside a so far untouched budget
of US$5 million for implementing mitigating measures such as afforestation;
however, even high-ranking officials at the provincial department for the environ-
ment and the EIA office are criticizing Sinohydro for its inaction. When ques-
tioned about this fund, the representative from Sinohydro responded that, “We
want to do a lot with this budget but we don’t know where to start. It would
be nice if we could work with the local government so they could tell us what
is important and what to prioritize. But things are very slow moving, due to
the language barriers and different working style.”81
Indeed, when Chinese SOEs enter new markets with complex environments of
heterogeneous legal and social demands, they often do not make it clear which
economic activities and practices can be considered legitimate and acceptable.82
Furthermore, there exists a vacuum of enforcement as local governance can be lax
or non-existent, particularly in weak or failed states in Africa. In such cases, the
enforcement of CSR programmes or social and environmental mitigation strategies
falls exclusively upon corporate managers, who might not necessarily be trained in
managing social, labour and environmental issues83 or perhaps might use Chinese
guidelines as their standard.84 Many companies hence depend on particular man-
agers’ experience to manage CSR issues, which leads to ad hoc and inconsistent
responses.85 Hence, there exists a gap between formulation, implementation and
enforcement of CSR regulations which can result in negative environmental and
social implications.86 Moreover, away from the seat of control in Beijing, managers
have more urgent issues at hand, such as how to overcome cultural and linguistic
barriers at local and national levels, and hiring/managing local workforces. In add-
ition, CSR policies tend to be determined mainly in company headquarters in
China; there are no specialized departments or units in Africa and Asia managing
CSR issues. Also, like many other non-binding governance mechanisms, it is ultim-
ately the company’s decision to implement CSR.
When comparing case studies, we found that, interestingly, EPC contractors
generally outperformed BOT companies in social and environmental standards
as many responsibilities are devolved to local partners (such as the Bui Power
Authority), who are more embedded within the local communities and have a
clearer understanding of local cultural and social norms and environmental con-
ditions. However, if the sole responsibility for compliance and mitigation lies in
the hands of the local owners/ partners, Chinese dam builders have no say in the
81 Interview with representative from Sinohydro Cambodia May 2013.
82 Scherer and Palazzo 2011.
83 Interview with a CSR practitioner, Beijing, 21 October 2011.
84 Scott 2012.
85 Zadek et al. 2009.
86 Mol 2011, 791.
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strategies used. Failure on the part of the local partners to manage or mitigate the
risks properly can lead to local opposition to the project. Companies who com-
pensated for their lack of local knowledge by employing local staff to deal with
such issues also performed better in both types of contracts.
Conclusion: Political Ecology of Chinese Hydropower Dams
This paper explores what shapes the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders
engaged in large hydropower projects in Asia and Africa. The recent slow-
down in the Chinese economy has huge implications for the global economy
and developing regions such as Africa and Asia. A reduction in Chinese trade
and investments has meant that borrowing nations now face challenges in
terms of debt repayment. This, however, does not mean that Chinese firms
building dams will slow down globally. On the contrary, the recent establish-
ment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, spearheaded by the
Chinese and the BRICs bank, together with the “one belt one road” initiative,
will see more initiatives and a stronger push for Chinese enterprises to go glo-
bal. This means SOEs such as Sinohydro and Three Gorges will be bidding
for more overseas infrastructure projects and more Chinese dams will be
built in the global south.
Moreover, as hydropower dams are one of the largest energy infrastructures in
the world and there is an enormous need to build more dams as part of the cli-
mate change mitigation strategy, we need to rethink how to minimize the adverse
effects of large dams and improve the sustainability of the hydropower industry.
Through a political ecology framework, this paper examines the power relations
between the different Chinese stakeholders at various phases of the project cycle.
From the decision making at the Chinese state level, to financing and subse-
quently the actual construction, we question where power lies and what empow-
ers the actors. In cases like the Kamchay Dam, we find that Sinohydro has the
most power to inscribe physical change on the environment and in turn affect
the livelihoods of the surrounding communities, but it also has the greatest poten-
tial to effect positive change in terms of mitigation strategies for long-term
improvements in the dam-building industry. For the Bui Dam, the power of
the Chinese builders is diluted by their partnership with the Bui Power
Authority, which has better knowledge of the local context and hence has the
tools to mitigate the negative consequences of the project. By knowing which
actor is most empowered at the different phases of the project, it is possible to
engage with the appropriate actor and argue for better formulation and imple-
mentation of the mitigation strategies in the long run.
The model for cooperation between Chinese actors and local partners also
plays a determining role in the outcome of the project. The PPP model is the pre-
ferred approach in terms of long-term ownership and social/environmental miti-
gation strategies. With more at stake for both the Chinese and local partners, the
global enterprises are “locked in” for a longer period of time which allows for
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more integration with the local communities and also provides space for mean-
ingful consultation and negotiation for the best mitigation strategies. It also
gives the local government a stronger role. This in turn will affect the power rela-
tions between the global and the local actors, and sustainable development for
both global enterprises and local communities.
Mitigation strategies play a big part in the sustainability of these Chinese
hydropower dams, but most Chinese global companies still lag behind Western
countries in terms of CSR and local implementation. From our four case studies,
we have found that there is a need for Chinese dam builders to understand CSR
as a collective mitigation strategy rather than mere philanthropy. Furthermore, it
is necessary to engage with Chinese global enterprises on international principles
such as the OECD guidelines for TNCs and responsible business conduct.
MOFCOM has shown a willingness to investigate these options. The OECD
recently held a special outreach session in Beijing to introduce the Chinese gov-
ernment to the OECD guidelines,87 and at a workshop the project team orga-
nized in 2015, Sinohydro mentioned its willingness to learn more about the
International Hydropower Association’s Sustainability Assessment Protocol,
although to date, it has not taken any action to adopt it. The importance of
due diligence for the whole supply chain and project cycle as a risk management
strategy should be communicated to these global builders and local partners per-
sistently. However, the Chinese companies’ rhetoric in terms of CSR and mitiga-
tion strategies has changed, from using their lack of knowledge of governance
and local laws to explain the gap to placing increasing emphasis on abiding
and respecting local laws, culture and customs and showing an interest in inter-
national best practice.
This paper also shows that host governments in Asia and Africa are relatively
lax on enforcement. Using the political ecology framework, we question what
empowers an actor in the dam-building process. It could be resources, such as
enforcement budgets, manpower, skills, and the knowledge and technology of
local regulatory agencies. This problem is not exclusive to our four case studies
but is evident in almost all developing regions and natural resource sectors.
However, there is a proliferation of empowered stakeholders with access to
media and technology who are able to make their voices heard in a global
arena. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter and WeChat have become
“engines of change” in this new age. As such, the checks and balances fall on
to the lap of civil society. For example, there are commendable efforts by various
international institutions and NGOs at the local and global level to socialize
China into the global norms of compliance with social and environmental stan-
dards and best practices in mitigation strategies. The World Wildlife Fund has
launched the Global Shift programme, which focuses on biodiversity and sustain-
able timber trade between China and Africa, while International Rivers is
87 OECD 2015.
Evaluating the Behaviour of Chinese Stakeholders 483
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741016001041
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Nottingham, on 10 Apr 2018 at 10:35:07, subject to the Cambridge Core
examining the ecological consequences of Chinese hydropower investments
around the world. At the same time, an increasing number of non-state actors
at the regional level in Africa, such as trade unions, civil society organizations,
academics and scientists, are turning their attention to Chinese companies and
their role in the exploitation of and low economic returns on environmental
resources.88 For example, the African Labour Research Network investigated
Chinese operations and their impacts on local communities and ecosystems.89
In particular, the work done by International Rivers in recent years on directly
engaging Chinese hydropower companies in various initiatives such as the bench-
marking exercise has had positive implications for knowledge exchange on best
practices and has created a platform for conversation on these matters.90
Thus, it is with growing pressure from non-state stakeholders at the local,
national, regional and global levels that changes to Chinese policy may be
achieved. At the same time, there is an urgent need to create legislative and insti-
tutional frameworks to check Chinese investment in developing regions (within
China and beyond) and particularly to address concerns with social and energy
justice, environmental protection and rehabilitation, and transparency and
accountability. Ultimately, creating an articulation and negotiation space for
non-state actors, which was previously unavailable to them, will allow their opi-
nions to be heard, meaningful consultation to be conducted and negotiation to
take place regarding their immediate environmental concerns surrounding their
livelihoods.
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摘要: 水电大坝项目近来因其满足低碳发电和可能减轻气候变化的偏好重
回聚光灯下。复兴大型水电项目的主角是作为国内和国外最大大坝建造者
的中国企业, 它们在中低收入国家开拓出了许多项目机会。然而大型水电
大坝除带来潜在的发展性和减少碳排放的贡献外, 还会伴随着巨大的经济
成本、深远的负面环境变化和社会影响。本文利用在加纳、尼日利亚、柬
埔寨和马来西亚的四个水电项目中收集到的田野数据将对参与亚非大型水
电项目中国利益相关方的行为进行评估。本文将先探明不同中国利益相关
方的利益点所在, 然后再对这些中国企业建造的大坝在当地、国家层面和
国际层面产生的影响进行探究。本文结论为虽然水电大坝有助于在未来提
高能源安全水平和降低能源型贫困, 但项目的规划、建造和缓解策略需要
更多以可持续的思路考虑国家层面的发展重点、当地社群的需求及对自然
生态的影响。
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